The Price of Weakness: Hydrocarbon Looting and the Erosion of the Colombian State

Colombia’s hydrocarbon sector faces an acute security and governance crisis, characterized by systemic looting of oil and its derivatives. This crisis is not the result of sporadic criminal behaviour, but the product of deeply entrenched structural weaknesses in the Colombian state. These vulnerabilities are embedded within historical patterns of governance designed to uphold unequal power structures and extractive economic models, rather than to provide inclusive development or effective territorial control. Instead of being a failed version of a strong state, Colombia exemplifies what scholars call an exceptionally well-crafted weak state — one that functions effectively for certain interests while systematically excluding others.

The state’s fragmented institutions and limited ability to enforce sovereignty, particularly in rural and conflict-affected regions, have fostered a fertile environment for organized armed groups (OAGs) to loot crude oil and use it to finance their illicit operations. These groups exploit the absence of regulation, capitalize on weak territorial control and benefit from the complicity or negligence of both public and private actors. At the same time, private companies often accept losses as part of the cost of doing business, underinvest in preventive measures and delegate security responsibilities to actors with no incentive to ensure long-term stability.

To survive, vulnerable communities facing poverty and limited opportunities frequently co-operate with illegal actors, thus participating in a cycle that perpetuates instability and criminal economies. This complex interplay of opportunism, limited accountability and historical marginalization generates moral hazard — a situation in which actors can avoid responsibility for negative outcomes while benefiting from the system’s dysfunction.